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This article introduces the special issue on the evolution of European Union development 
policy, against the background of fundamental challenges that have emerged since the 
2009 Lisbon Treaty. The special issue’s objective is to highlight the complex dynamics of 
a policy area that is called on to address the massive challenges of poverty, inequality, 
healthcare capacity, climate change, insecurity and weak governance in countries of the 
global south, and at the same time support European foreign policy objectives including 
political stability, migration management, access to resources and markets. In this 
introductory article, we attempt to sketch the broad outlines of the conceptual and 
practical dilemmas faced by a policy area that is supposed to be able to fix almost any 
problem. We observe that European development policy’s evolution is driven by the 
tension between its raison d’être as a concrete expression of global solidarity and 
international cooperation, and its increasing instrumentalisation in the service of European 
economic and security interests. We highlight some of the key challenges that have 
emerged in the last decade, including rising populist nationalism and Brexit within Europe, 
the changing nature of relationships between Europe and countries who receive EU aid, 
and the changing nature of development cooperation itself, exemplified by the 2030 
Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals. We outline the specific contributions the 
articles in this special issue make to research and policy debates on the themes we raise 
in this introduction. We conclude that the battle between the forces of solidarity and 
instrumentality has evolved EU development policy into an impossibly complex arena of 






















EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY: THE ONE YOU TURN TO WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN 
The EU’s international development policy has been evolving continuously over the last 
decade, in response both to the shifting international development landscape and to 
shifting political realities inside the EU. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, 
the global impacts of the 2008 financial crisis became apparent and the austerity with 
which many EU governments responded to the ensuing Euro crisis had both financial and 
political consequences for development cooperation (Berginer 2019). Increasing migration 
pressure on Europe, due to myriad factors including demographic change, increasing 
global inequality, the impacts of climate change on many developing regions, wars and 
mass displacement, and incoherent European immigration policies, has had huge impacts 
on development policy frameworks and aid budgets, especially since the Syrian refugee 
crisis in the autumn of 2015 (Knoll and Sherriff 2017).  
 
Since 2015, global development has itself been reconceptualised as an interrelated set of 
multifaceted economic, environmental, and institutional challenges by the 2030 Agenda 
and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with far-reaching implications for the 
norms and practices of international development cooperation (Brown 2020). Meanwhile, 
geopolitical shifts, including the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India and South 
Africa) and Arabian Gulf donors, the retreat of the United States from its pre-eminent role 
in global development, and the fast-approaching end of the ‘post-colonial’ development 
paradigm, are all challenging the EU to re-define its global position as a leading donor of 
official development assistance, and as a decision-making system where global 
development norms and standards are set (Gänzle et al. 2012; Schöneberg 2016).  
 
EU development policy is not only expected to address the consequences of poverty, 
inequality, weak governance, climate change, environmental degradation and unmanaged 
migration. It has also come to be seen as the EU’s ‘cornerstone’ policy, able to address 
the ‘root causes’ of these phenomena, including socio-economic exclusion, continued 
reliance on fossil fuels, unsustainable agricultural practices, violent conflict, elite 
corruption and political repression. For example, development policy has been called upon 
to respond to the unprecedented shock from the Coronavirus crisis in 2020, even before 
the consequences of the pandemic for developing countries could have been known 
(Urpilainen 2020). Such enormous expectations inevitably raise impossible demands on 
political decision-makers and the bureaucratic systems through which policies are defined, 
negotiated and implemented. However, despite all these demands on development policy, 
the budgets for financing cooperation have remained well below the 0.7% of GNI 
commitment for aid spending in most EU countries (Orbie and Lightfoot 2017). 
THE EVOLUTION OF EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN RESPONSE TO THE FORCES OF 
SOLIDARITY AND INSTRUMENTALITY 
The evolution of EU development policy has been traditionally influenced by several long-
term, mostly unresolved puzzles. These include the challenges of working together in a 
policy area defined as a ‘shared competence’ in EU legalese, meaning that the policies of 
the EU institutions should not compromise the ability of member states to pursue their 
bilateral development policies and cooperation programmes.1 This structural issue has in 
turn made the question of how member states and EU institutions should work together a 
matter of interpretation and constant re-negotiation, resulting in inherent challenges of 
coordination, both at the strategic/policy level and at the level of the implementation of 
programmes and projects in partner countries (Koch 2015).  
 
A further, long-term challenge is that of policy coherence, both in terms of managing the 
so-called ‘nexuses’ between EU-level policies like agriculture, trade, foreign/security policy 





and development, as well as clear incoherencies with member state policies like migration, 
tax and fiscal regimes, or arms sales (Adelle and Jordan 2014; Carbone and Keijzer 2016, 
Furness and Gänzle 2017). At a conceptual level, these issues have been debated not only 
by scholars of EU development policy but also as part of the broader external relations 
discussions of the EU’s 'actorness' or, its nature, purpose and effectiveness as a global 
actor (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Niemann and Bretherton 2013). 
 
In addition to these long-term, structural questions, one may add a long list of challenges 
that have emerged in the decade since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Many of these 
concern matters that have always been on top of the EC/EU development policy agenda. 
For instance, while relationships with Africa, both at the continent-to-continent level of 
AU-EU relations, and at the levels of EU relations with individual African countries and 
bilateral relations between EU member states and African countries, have become less 
‘post-colonial,’ they have not evolved into ‘partnerships of equals’ (Gomes 2013; 
Barbarinde 2019; Carbone 2019). Nevertheless, the days when the EU or certain member 
states could impose their will in Africa are over. This is partly due to the influence of 
emerging actors like the BRICS countries, whose impact in Africa has grown and provided 
African countries with alternative markets and development models to that offered by the 
EU. The increasing influence of the BRICS (especially China) in Africa has led to relative 
decline in the EU’s influence in the region, including the attractiveness of the values 
promoted by the EU (Hackenesch 2018). 
 
New priorities on the political agendas of many European governments have had major 
implications for European development policies at both the member state and at the EU 
level. Arguably, the most significant of these has been increased migration pressure on 
the EU from outside of Europe, driven by demographic factors, as well as by economic 
inequality and forced displacement due to conflict and environmental degradation. While 
the political fall-out can be seen most clearly in the Syrian refugee crisis of the autumn of 
2015, this built on many other preceding situations and has been kept alive by ensuing 
ones. The ways in which the migration challenge has been interpreted and politicised have 
led to a number of potentially conflicting demands on the EU’s external policies. Member 
state policy makers have called on the EU to use its diplomatic influence and especially its 
development resources to halt the flow of refugees and migrants through programmes 
and projects that aim to address the so-called ‘root causes’ of migration and displacement, 
and by attempting to make the disbursement of aid conditional on cooperation on 
migration and security matters (Rozbicka and Szent-Iványi 2020). Many development 
researchers, as well as prominent voices in the European Commission and Parliament, 
have emphasized the positive impacts of migration for development, and have argued that 
the EU needs to better harness this by developing channels for controlled migration (Knoll 
and Sheriff 2017).  
 
In the development cooperation field itself, the agenda has been broadened from the 
‘make poverty history’ narrative and the Millennium Development Goals of the 2000s to 
the sustainable development narrative and the SDGs. This shifted the main focus from 
poverty and health to attempting to capture the essentially multifaceted and interrelated 
nature of global development, while at the same time effectively making every conceivable 
policy area relevant from a development perspective (Fukuda-Parr and McNeill 2019). 
Such transformations raise questions not only about what the scope and contents of EU 
and member state development policies should be, but also highlight many unresolved 
issues around policy coherence (Carbone and Keijzer, 2016).  
 
The EU has taken a leading role in driving the sustainable development agenda, and has 
built for itself a position that has brought a new set of challenges and responsibilities. At 
a discursive level and especially after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, the EU has been 





one of the most active promoters of the principles of international partnerships. However, 
due to the dynamics between reformers and status-quo defenders within the EU’s legal 
and policymaking systems, as well as the divergent views that the EU and partner 
countries have expressed, the actual changes aimed at making eye-level cooperation the 
major principle for advancing sustainable development have been much less ambitious 
than promised. The EU has not yet fully replaced the system of asymmetrical donor-
recipient relationships (Keijzer and Black, 2020). 
 
These recent global shifts have also been complemented by internal challenges to the EU, 
many of which raise questions linked to international cooperation. Brexit arguably poses 
the most important challenge among these. Before its withdrawal from the organisation, 
the UK was one of the largest contributors to the EU’s international development spending. 
At the same time, as one of the world’s largest bilateral donors, it has added significant 
clout to the EU’s engagements with developing countries. The UK has also been one of the 
more influential shapers of the EU’s development and neighbourhood policies in the past 
decades, and its retreat from EU policymaking on development started to be felt as soon 
as the referendum on EU membership was announced in late 2015 (Lightfoot et al. 2017).  
A further, related set of challenges has been posed by the rise of nationalist populism, 
both within Europe and internationally. Feelings in Western societies that political and 
economic elites have become detached from and irresponsive to the needs of the people 
have been exploited by populist politicians of various stripes. An implication of this for 
development policy has been the calls made by both populists, and policymakers looking 
to outflank populists, for development aid to better serve the ‘national interest’, which has 
often been portrayed to be at odds with global goals (Thier and Alexander, 2019). Despite 
increasing evidence on the negative effects of such measures on all involved parties (Fine 
et al. 2019), populist politicians have argued for cutting aid and using the resources 
domestically, or refocussing aid on preventing migration (Gomez-Reino 2019). 
 
Arguably, the cumulative effect of these challenges has been to exacerbate a fundamental 
dilemma for European development cooperation: achieving the right balance between 
solidarity, on the one hand, and instrumentality on the other. Solidarity is the core value 
of the international development social contract, in which the rich world is supposed to 
help poor countries end poverty and eventually create prosperity for all (Lumsdaine 1993). 
Whether this is driven by moral values and altruism, or some form of “enlightened self-
interest” is secondary; aid influenced by solidarity places the concerns of the poor at its 
centre. Instrumentality refers to the tendency to see development aid, and also other 
cooperation tools that are intended to support public goods provision, rather as 
instruments for creating ’private’ gain, whether this is derived from the national interests 
of a donor country or indeed the private interests of individuals and groups that can 
influence policy (Asongu and Jellal 2016). In this sense, aid becomes an instrument of 
pursuing policy or other goals which are essentially outside of the realm of development 
policy. 
 
The literature on EU development cooperation has explored this dilemma from various 
perspectives. Scholars working with positivist analytical frameworks have discussed the 
challenges to collective action, both in terms of actors working together, and in terms of 
the coherence of substantive policy issues which contradict and undermine each other 
(Bodenstein et al. 2017; McLean 2013; Schneider and Tobin 2013). Others working from 
social constructivist perspectives have addressed the questions of identity and values that 
the dilemma raises, as well as the practical implications of the EU’s ‘Janus-faced’ tendency 
to say one thing in its policy documents and do something quite different in the actual 
practice of its cooperation with developing countries (Hadfield 2007; Babarinde 2019). 





CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE 
The contributions to this special issue aim to further advance this literature through the 
exploration, analysis and discussion of key issues that have brought the solidarity – 
instrumentality dilemma into focus in various ways in the decade since the Lisbon Treaty. 
At the same time, they highlight important aspects of the processes through which the 
European Union is evolving, both as an international development actor and as a 
policymaking system, due to the tensions created by the core solidarity-instrumentality 
dilemma. We have arranged the articles in three groups based on their thematic focus, 
bookended by a broader reflection that revisits several of the issues raised in this 
introduction. 
 
The first set of articles explores the ways in which the guiding policy frameworks for 
development policy are evolving and are challenged by various actors, in response to the 
global geopolitical shifts and political pressure from within the EU. Both articles in this set 
illustrate internal and external pressures towards greater aid instrumentalisation, and 
show that the EU has not been immune to these.  
 
Holden’s article discusses the dilemma between solidarity and instrumentality in the 
context of rising global illiberalism and other challenges, which have led to the increasing 
dominance of a new ‘geoeconomic’ or neomercantilist worldview among policy makers 
(Holden 2020). This approach to making sense of global affairs facilitates the use of aid 
as an instrument for promoting political and economic self-interest. Holden analyses the 
shift towards geoeconomics in a historical context, and examines how it has impacted the 
EU’s development policy. Specifically, Holden focuses on how the EU has framed two policy 
initiatives: blended finance and the merging of development funds into a single integrated 
financial instrument. Both of these initiatives would allow the greater instrumentalisation 
of aid for economic and geopolitical purposes. Nevertheless, Holden concludes that due to 
its nature, the EU is less susceptible to these kinds of pressures than its member states, 
or other nation-states like the United States are. These conclusions imply that while the 
EU is not immune to greater aid instrumentalisation, solidarity may continue to be a 
feature of its development policy.  
 
The article by Szent-Iványi and Kugiel (2020) examines how the ‘illiberal’ populist 
governments in Hungary and Poland have shifted their countries’ international 
development policies, and have attempted to shape the policy on the EU level. In a sense, 
both countries have promoted the shift towards a greater instrumentalisation of EU 
development aid, especially in terms of managing the flows of refugees and migrants, with 
Hungary being especially vocal and disruptive. The paper argues that while Poland sees 
the recent changes in EU development policy regarding the aid-migration nexus as 
favourable (and evidence of the Polish government’s influence), Hungary would want the 
EU to implement even more radical changes. However, the article also notes that Hungary 
may have instrumentalised development policy in its own way, using it to send signals of 
its willingness to become a more disruptive member should the EU become tougher in 
challenging the authoritarian nature of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s governance.  
 
The second set of articles addresses the issue of how the challenges outlined at the 
beginning of this introduction have impacted on specific aspects of European development 
policy, and in turn have influenced the EU’s ability to shape the international development 
landscape.  
 
Hurt’s article focuses on the post-Cotonou partnership negotiations with Africa and is 
specifically concerned with the scope for increased ‘African agency’ in shaping a new 
relationship with the EU (Hurt 2020). The article contributes an important new case-study 





to the existing literature on ‘African agency’ in international politics by considering the 
scope for Africa to exert agency within the post-Cotonou negotiations, given the 
negotiation of a specific regional compact with Africa. It adopts a structurally embedded 
view of agency, as a fit between institutions, ideas and material relations. Hurt’s central 
argument is that, in comparison to the negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement two decades 
ago, there is greater scope for African agency. However, both the ideational and material 
aspects of Africa’s relationship with the EU condition the limits to how effective such 
agency might be. The EU envisages a greater role for the private sector and remains 
determined to continue to base its trade relationship with Africa on Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) in the short-medium term. In recent years, African institutions have 
expressed bold aims for industrialisation and job creation, but the EU’s vision – which is 
based on advancing European economic and political interests – will hinder, rather than 
support, this ambition.  
 
Kugiel (2020) discusses the division of labour (DoL) in European development cooperation, 
which was regarded as a high priority in the 2000s and early 2010s but all but disappeared 
from the agenda later in the decade. Though the Union still promotes joint programming 
for better aid coordination, other EU interests took precedence. This reflects the general 
trend of instrumentalisation in European development cooperation, which is less focused 
on traditional goals like poverty eradication or aid effectiveness but serves more political, 
security, and economic self-interests. Kugiel traces the evolution of the European approach 
to DoL and highlights the major reasons for its limited successes. He argues that among 
the most important of these was the imprecise and inadequate description of the EU’s own 
comparative advantage and added value, compared to member state bilateral aid 
programmes. Kugiel proposes the concept of functional DoL, in which the European 
institutions focus development assistance more on the regional level, while leaving 
national programmes to the member states. 
 
In her article, Rabinovych (2020) notes that the EU’s long-term commitment to 
development cooperation and the pre-existing policy support for the 2030 Agenda in the 
EU institutions indicate an ongoing political consensus, especially on human rights aspects. 
Nevertheless, she argues that the current legal framework presents several interconnected 
challenges at both international and EU levels that could allow states to adopt a more 
instrumental approach. The 2030 Agenda is a non-binding international agreement, which, 
as a soft law document, is connected to international treaty law particularly through the 
signatories’ commitment to implement pre-existing treaties. It therefore has significant 
potential to impact international customary law and to encourage cross-fertilization 
between international and EU law. However, due the fact that existing International Court 
of Justice opinions on the nature of UN General Assembly resolutions are contradictory, it 
cannot prevent states from developing different interpretations and approaches to the 
2030 Agenda, which could in turn facilitate an instrumental view of development 
cooperation. However, the consensual nature of the 2030 Agenda, its connections to ‘hard’ 
law, the existing practice of ‘substantive borrowing’ from international law to EU law when 
gaps are identified, and the scope of the SDGs, which is strongly connected to the EU’s 
principles and values, also suggest that the solidarity dimension may remain significant 
and influence the future evolution of EU law in this area. 
 
The third group of articles engages with the topic of how the UK leaving has started to 
impact EU development cooperation, and the scope for continued, bespoke British 
involvement in EU development initiatives, especially the new convention between the EU 
and the ACP countries, and the European Development Fund.  
 
Olivié and Perez’s article explores the potential medium-term impact of Brexit on both EU 
and global aid (Olivié and Perez 2020). Their results show that UK aid has increased since 





the Brexit vote in 2016. This has come in hand with a shifting pattern of allocation: 
increases in aid provided for domestic research in health issues, stronger links with private 
actors and with academia, a fall in aid directed to least developed countries, and the 
dispersion of aid funds across several ministries. These changes are aligned with a realist 
scenario, rather than reflecting nationalist behaviour on the part of the UK, which would 
result in decreasing aid and weaker links with partner countries. As a result, Olivié and 
Perez argue that there will be no major impacts on global aid levels. However, given that 
the EU is losing the UK’s contribution to the general budget, and also a major bilateral 
donor, the EU’s aid will be strongly cut. Moreover, given that post-Brexit EU-UK 
collaboration on aid matters remains unlikely, British funds formerly channelled via EU 
institutions are likely to be re-internalized and allocated according to the shifted pattern 
of British aid.  
 
Langan’s article unpacks the notion that Brexit would lead to greater solidarity with Africa, 
from the UK rather than from the EU (Langan 2020). He notes that prominent Brexiteers 
claimed that the UK’s newfound independence would usher in a new era, whereby the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) and a resurgent UK Department for 
International Trade (DFIT) would be able to offer aid and free trade unencumbered by the 
cynicism of the European Commission. Recent policy papers from both DFID and DFIT, 
however, have made clear that the UK intends to replicate the Economic Partnership 
Agreements with sub-regions of the ACP bloc. Langan considers that despite a rhetorical 
commitment to a more equal partnership between the UK and many African countries, the 
reality of the UK’s post-Brexit vision for development will intensify a ‘new scramble for 
Africa’. This will have major implications as to how the UK and the EU manage their broader 
relationships in the area of development cooperation. 
 
The final article in this special issue builds on these three themes and takes a critical look 
at the past, present and future of EU development cooperation and research. Delputte and 
Orbie (2020) focus on the difficulty of identifying change and continuity in the EU’s 
development policy. While rhetoric from EU leaders of paradigm shifts, ‘new chapters’ and 
‘fresh starts’ has been frequent in the past decades, Delputte and Orbie argue that radical 
breaks in how the EU approaches its relationships with developing countries are not easily 
visible in practice. The changes that have happened, via the various policy experiments 
discussed in the article, fit into the EU’s existing paradigm of development, which critics 
have labelled ‘Eurocentric, modernist and colonial’ (Schöneberg 2016). Delputte and Orbie 
deploy insights from paradigm change and post-development theory, and outline a new 
research agenda which can make better sense of change and continuity, as well as 
promote thinking along different paradigms to better appreciate the ‘pluriverse’ of 
alternatives to development. In this sense, the dilemma between solidarity and 
instrumentalisation fits squarely in the EU’s existing development paradigm, and 
movements in practice towards greater solidarity or greater instrumentalisation do not 
represent new chapters, but rather pendulum swings in emphasis.  
EMERGING TRENDS IN EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND RESEARCH 
The articles in this collection suggest that at least three trends are emerging, which open 
fascinating and challenging avenues for research on EU development policy over the next 
decade or so.  
 
First, aid has become increasingly instrumentalised, shifting away from the principles of 
the post-millennium international aid effectiveness agenda and more towards a situation 
where aid has become a tool for pursuing the political interests of donors. The 
instrumentalisation of aid is contested, both from outside development policy decision-





making systems and from within, and there remain many instances of aid spending and 
new cooperation initiatives along lines that are entirely consistent with the principles of 
international solidarity expressed by the global aid and development effectiveness agenda 
(Saltnes 2020). Nevertheless, the pressure to use aid as a tool for pursuing foreign or 
domestic policy interests that are not consistent with these principles is enormous and this 
is having a clear impact, both on the framing of strategy and the programming of aid 
(Hadfield and Lightfoot 2020).  
 
Second, achieving policy coherence for development as an outcome has always been a 
tough challenge, due to the power imbalances of interest constituencies responsible for 
policymaking in key areas which can undermine the core goal of development policy, 
namely poverty eradication in developing countries. In recent years, the increasing 
complexity of global development means that policy coherence has become all but 
impossible. This is not only a problem for the EU – all actors engaged in development 
cooperation face the ‘wicked problem’ of making policies coherent with each other, and 
the SDGs themselves, some of which are mutually incoherent, have not helped in this 
regard. Accordingly, the effort to make policies coherent with each other will have to be 
abandoned in favour of approaches that prioritise between mutually inconsistent 
objectives, thereby forcing policymakers to face the political trade-offs that must inevitably 
arise.  
 
Third, the EU is still struggling to find a role for itself in the modern world. This will not 
become easier if the EU itself continues to be weakened and undermined by rising 
nationalism in Europe, and consequently by less willingness to show solidarity with and 
cooperate with others. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s first international trip 
was to Africa. In doing so, she clearly indicated that the geopolitical priorities for her 
Commission included a closer relationship with Europe’s neighbouring continent. From a 
development cooperation perspective, the most significant change from the Juncker to the 
von der Leyen Commission is the replacement of the EU ‘Development’ Commissioner with 
a Commissioner for ‘International Partnerships’. It remains unclear whether this marks a 
rhetorical or substantive change, although it has been noted that the new title is less neo-
colonial sounding (Delputte and Orbie 2020). 
 
In this context, the articles in this special issue indicate that future research on the 
dilemma between solidarity and instrumentality in EU development cooperation could 
engage more closely with the following themes. There is, for example, already a need to 
explore in more depth the connection between, on the one hand, democratic institutions 
and practices, and, on the other hand, the potentially anti-democratic politics-policy 
nexuses within the global, EU and local landscapes of international cooperation for 
development. Research will need to trace the engagement of individuals and actors with 
phenomena like increasing digitalisation, which is already raising significant challenges to 
the solidarity / instrumentality dilemma at national, EU and global levels. The increasing 
securitisation of cooperation with countries in the global south will remain a key topic for 
research, both with regard to nexus-management at the operational level, as well as at 
the policy level as the voices calling for the militarisation of the EU grow louder (Borrell 
and Breton 2020). A further theme is the tension raised by the migration-development 
nexus between the demands of domestic constituencies, whose taxes pay for development 
aid, and polities in partner countries. This dilemma is most clearly raised by the increased 
use of aid for migration management purposes, but it is also present in the fact that 
economic development can increase migration levels, even though aid increases are often 
sold as measures to address the ‘root causes’ of migration (Knoll and Sheriff 2017). Whose 
solidarity is EU development cooperation supposed to serve? 
 





While the impacts of the 2020 Covid-19 crisis for the EU and its development partners are 
still unfolding at the time of writing, it is clear that they will be far-reaching. As one senior 
European Commission official has noted, Covid-19 ‘represents the biggest ever stress test 
for development cooperation and its ability to address shared global challenges, including 
in their political dimension’ (Manservisi 2020). The EU’s initial response to the crisis 
provides a case study of what this introductory article has addressed. The rousing rhetoric 
around the TEAM Europe package promised to combine resources from the EU, its member 
states, and financial institutions, in particular the European Investment Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to support vulnerable countries in 
their fight against the pandemic. Once again, development policy was being deployed in a 
crisis to fix a problem, but with regard to its ‘root causes’ (viral transmission and the lack 
of health sector capacity) and its potential socio-economic fallout. The kind of multi-agency 
cooperation promised by the EU can be seen as an important step in more effective 
delivery. However, the fact that the 20 billion euros pledged were not additional but rather 
reallocated from existing external action resources immediately raised concerns that the 
EU was promising more than it could deliver, and that other important programmes which 
had not been allocated specific budgets would be left on the shelf as the crisis response 
absorbed resources. Such concerns reflect agreement among experts that Covid-19 will 
put immense pressure on member state budgets for many years, further contributing to 
the ‘inward looking agenda’ of the EU (Beringer et al. 2019; Rios 2020).  
 
Instrumentality is, therefore, likely to dominate the political agenda in all areas of EU 
external action in the short term. Nevertheless, although the pendulum has swung towards 
instrumentality, this does not mean it cannot swing back. The shock of the 2020 Covid-19 
crisis clearly demonstrated the need for solidarity with regard to global health, if not with 
regard to the best way to deal with the social and economic consequences of a pandemic. 
The challenge is therefore to ensure that amid the pressures placed on the European Union 
by the pandemic, the central concept of solidarity is not forgotten in development policy 
and practice.  
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1 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 4): “In the areas of development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; however, the 
exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.” 
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